SOK: A PRACTICAL COST COMPARISON AMONG PROVABLE DATA
POSSESSION SCHEMES

A Thesis
presented to
the Faculty of California Polytechnic State University,
San Luis Obispo

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in Computer Science

by
Alex Bartlett
May 2018

c 2018
Alex Bartlett
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

ii

COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP

TITLE:

SoK: A Practical Cost Comparison Among
Provable Data Possession Schemes

AUTHOR:

Alex Bartlett

DATE SUBMITTED:

May 2018

COMMITTEE CHAIR:

Zachary N.J. Peterson, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Computer Science

COMMITTEE MEMBER:

Bruce DeBruhl, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Computer Science

COMMITTEE MEMBER:

Phillip Nico, Ph.D.
Professor of Computer Science

iii

Abstract
SoK: A Practical Cost Comparison Among Provable Data Possession Schemes
Alex Bartlett

Provable Data Possession (PDP) schemes provide users with the ability to efficiently
audit and verify the integrity of data stored with potentially unreliable third-parties,
such as cloud storage service providers. While dozens of PDP schemes have been
developed, no PDP schemes have been implemented with an existing cloud service.
This work attempts to provide a starting point for the integration of PDP schemes
with cloud storage service providers by providing a cost analysis of PDP schemes.
This cost analysis is performed by implementing and analyzing five PDP schemes
representative of the dozens of various PDP approaches. This paper provides analysis
of the overhead and performance of each of these schemes to generate a comparable
cost for each scheme using real-world cloud pricing models. Results show that the
total cost of each scheme is comparable for smaller file sizes, but for larger files this
cost can vary across schemes by an order of magnitude. Ultimately, the difference
in cost between the simple MAC-based PDP scheme and the most “efficient” PDP
scheme is negligible. While the MAC-PDP scheme may not be the most efficient,
no other scheme improving upon its complexity can be implemented without the use
of additional services or APIs leading to the conclusion that the simplest, storage
only PDP scheme is the most practical to implement. Furthermore, the findings
in this paper suggest that, in general, PDP schemes optimize on an inaccurate cost
model and that future schemes should consider the existing economic realities of cloud
services.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Numerous organizations around the world have begun to rely on 3rd party storage,
such as clouds, to store excess data. 3rd party storage allows these organizations
many benefits, the most prominent being saving storage locally. However, saving
data with a 3rd party comes with an increased security risk. Organizations need to
be able to securely verify that data they store on 3rd party servers remains in the
possession of the server and accessible from the server. However, remotely verifying
that the server fulfills its contractual obligations to store data can be challenging.
Data stored on a 3rd party server that is infrequently accessed is prone to undetectable
loss from inadvertent administration errors or malicious activity from the storage
service provider. A malicious storage service provider may not disclose a data loss
incident in order to preserve its reputation or delete storage that is infrequently used
in order to resell the same storage space to a different party. Data loss incidents
from popular cloud storage providers such as Amazon S3 or Dropbox emphasize the
need for an efficient and reliable auditing mechanism to ensure that data stored on
3rd party platforms remains intact. This is where Provable Data Possession (PDP)
schemes can be utilized.

PDP schemes provide probabilistic guarantees that data stored on a remote storage
server has not been maliciously or accidentally altered. PDP schemes are designed to
provide these probabilistic guarantees at a low cost to both the client and the server.
To do this, PDP schemes must be able to provide the client with a proof of data
possession from the server without needing the client to retrieve the entire file from
the server and without needing the server to access the entire file. Numerous meth-

1

ods have been developed to achieve sufficient provable data possession while limiting
costs, but despite years of research into the viability of PDP schemes there are no
existing practical implementations for any commercial cloud service. This may be
because prior research of PDP schemes has focused primarily on providing a high
probability guarantee of data possession to the client and minimizing bandwidth between the client/server interactions without considering any technique to compare
the real world efficiencies of PDP schemes. While probabilistic guarantees and bandwidth minimization are vital aspects of PDP schemes, without a viable example of
real world costs of a PDP scheme (i.e. the time it takes to generate a challenge, verify
a proof, tag the file, cost to store the tags, run an audit service, service audit requests,
etc.) it is very difficult to know which PDP schemes work best in practice.

This work attempts to bridge the gap between research and implementation of
PDP schemes. To do so, a taxonomy of PDP schemes was created. This taxonomy
compiles research from over 30 different PDP schemes into a single classification table making it easy to identify PDP schemes with similar characteristics. Using this
taxonomy, five different PDP schemes were identified that can be used to wholly
represent various characteristics of the entirety of PDP schemes. These were then
implemented as an open-source library, libpdp. Libpdp provides generic cost models
based on mathematical formulas that express abstract models that can be used to determine future cost. These cost models allow for a real word cost analysis of any PDP
scheme. A comparison and validation of the cost models is provided for each of the
five implemented schemes in libpdp. This comparison provides an accurate distinction between the five implemented schemes (MAC-PDP, A-PDP, SE-PDP, CPOR,
and MR-PDP) and allows a proper determination of which scheme functions best in
a practical, real-world environment. The costs were evaluated in terms of recurring
computational costs induced by running the PDP schemes.
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Based on the cost models provided in libpdp, the five PDP schemes implemented
were found to be most cost-comparable in terms of preprocessing, storing, and auditing. More complex PDP schemes that prioritize lower communication complexity at
the cost greater preprocessing and storage costs were found to be significantly more
expensive in practice. There was a high variance in total basis costs (up-front cost to
tag and additional, cumulative costs for storing and auditing data) across the implemented schemes, especially with larger file sizes. Auditing a 1GB file for one year at
one audit per hour is under $1 for MAC-PDP, A-PDP, MR-PDP, and CPOR, but that
cost inflates to a range of $4,400 to $38,700 across schemes for a 1PB file. Auditing
once per hour with each scheme was an arbitrary choice that allowed for comparisons
between each implemented scheme. In practice, the user of a PDP scheme would
perform audits at a rate based on how important the data is they are storing. Additionally, this paper claims that schemes which require server side processing do not
fit with pre-existing cloud APIs leading to the conclusion that the simplest, storageonly scheme may be the most cost-efficient to practically implement. The findings of
this paper suggest that all PDP schemes may be optimizing utilizing an inaccurate
cost model and that PDP schemes developed in the future should consider existing
realities of server-side implementations on cloud storage providers.

The rest of this paper is formatted as follows. In Chapter 2 there will be a background on relevant PDP specific information and notations that will help provide a
foundation and understanding for the rest of this paper. In Chapter 3 relevant related work will be presented and used to give a background of the five chosen PDP
schemes. Then, the taxonomy of PDP schemes will be introduced and discussed in
Chapter 4 to provide context as to how the five implemented represent the entirety of
PDP schemes. Next, the paper will cover the design and implementation of the five
algorithms in libpdp in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will cover and explain the Operation
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Models used within libpdp while Chapter 7 will provide an evaluation and explanation of the results obtained from the implementation. Possible future work will be
discussed in Chapter 8. Finally, Chapter 9 will provide concluding thoughts to the
paper.
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Chapter 2
BACKGROUND

Generically, PDP schemes can be broken up into two different phases: a setup phase
and a verification phase. During the setup phase, the client will generate keys (private and/or public, depending on the scheme) and use those keys to tag their file.
Typically, the file will be split up into blocks and each block will be tagged individually. The client will then send the file along with the tags to the storage service
provider and delete their local copies. During the verification phase the client will
typically select a random subset of blocks to generate a challenge for. The client
will then create a challenge and then send the challenge to the prover. The prover
uses the challenge and the file blocks to generate a proof of verification that it sends
back to the client. The client then uses the proof of verification to verify that the
server actually possesses the correct data, providing a probabilistic guarantee that
the prover does or does not possess the challenged data.
To further explain PDP algorithms, this paper follows the notation of Juels and
Kaliski [27] and Bower, Juels, and Oprea [12]. A file M can be divided into n blocks,
M = hm1 , m2 , ..., mn i. P will denote the prover (storage provider), V denotes the
verifier (client or third-party auditor), η denotes the file’s identifier, and ω denotes
local client state. A generic PDP scheme can be considered a five-tuple of algorithms,
(Key-Gen, Tag, Challenge, Proof, Verify) which can be described as the following:

KeyGen(1k ) → (pk, sk) This algorithm is used by the client to generate random
public and private keys by employing security parameter k.

Tag(M ; pk, sk, ω) → Mη∗ This algorithm is used by the client to process a file and
5

produce verification tag data. It takes as input a public and private key pair
(pk, sk) and file M . It generates a file ID η and returns Mη∗ , the encoded file
with verification tag data. It also updates the client state ω to include any
locally held data such as the file ID, file size, number of blocks, etc. The data
Mη∗ can be stored remotely.

Challenge(η; pk, sk, ω) → c This algorithm is used by the client to produce a challenge c. This challenge is sent to the prover during an audit.

Proof(η, Mη∗ , c; pk) → p This algorithm is used by the prover to demonstrate proof
of possession of specified file blocks as a response to challenge c. It takes as
input the remote, encoded data Mη∗ and challenge c, to generate proof p.

Verify(c, p, η; pk, sk, ω) → b ∈ {0, 1} This algorithm is used by the client to validate
the proof p. It takes as input the public and private key pair (pk, sk), challenge
c and proof p. Upon successful validation it returns 1, else it returns 0.

2.1

Analyzed Schemes

This paper focuses on five specific PDP schemes: a basic Message Authentication
Code (MAC) based scheme (MAC-PDP), the scheme developed by Ateniese, Burns,
Curtmola, Herring, Kissner, Peterson and Song (A-PDP) [5], the scheme developed
by Curtmola, Khan, Burns, and Ateniese (MR-PDP) [18], the scheme developed by
Ateniese, Di Pietro, Mancini and Tsudik (SE-PDP) [6], and the scheme developed by
Shacham and Waters (CPOR) [37].
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These schemes were chosen due to their unique characteristics that can be used
to represent all existing PDP schemes. MAC-PDP and SE-PDP are reliant on using
symmetric key primitives; MAC-PDP is the simplest PDP scheme, it does not require
any cryptographic computation from the cloud storage provider, whereas SE-PDP
requires a degree of server-side computation. CPOR provides the public verifiability
characteristic and optimizes for proof compactness. A-PDP was developed using
public key primitives, requires computation from the cloud service provider, and also
allows for public verifiability. Furthermore, all the schemes have various size and
computational complexity of their tags, challenges, and proofs, which allowed this
research to differentiate between storage and computation costs. These schemes and
their characteristics are discussed further in Chapters 3 and 4.

2.2

Scheme Complexity

The complexity of each analyzed scheme is provided in Table 2.1. The block size,
bs, is a function of file size and n, the number of file blocks, where bs = file size /
n. MAC-PDP endures a relatively high communication complexity, which is offset
by the simplicity in it’s implementation. The remaining schemes, A-PDP, MR-PDP,
CPOR, and SE-PDP were designed to optimize communication complexity at the
cost of computational and storage complexity.
Table 2.1: Communication Complexity of Target Schemes
Challenge
Proof
MAC-PDP
A-PDP
MR-PDP
CPOR
SE-PDP

O(` log(n))
O(log(` + 2κ + log(N ))
O(log(` + 2κ + log(N ))
O(` + (log(n) + d))
O(L)
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O(`(bs + k))
O(log(N ))
O(log(N ))
O(log(p))
O(d + L)

2.3

Comparison Criteria

In order to accurately make a comparison between PDP schemes, comparable criteria
amongst all schemes must be selected. The following 3 concepts are criteria in which
PDP schemes may be considered to be comparable:

2.3.1

Strength of Security.

For any given scheme, this is expressed as Pr[forge], the probability that a prover
can manipulate the verifier to accept a forged proof as valid, i.e. when the proof was
computed without the use of each challenged block by the verifier.

2.3.2

Strength of Audit.

For any given scheme, this is expressed as Pr[audit], the probability that a single audit
will be validated even when k of n blocks have been deleted. For numerous schemes,
this is a combinatorial argument based on the probability that the ` random challenge
indices are among the k blocks deleted.

2.3.3

Efficiency of Recovery.

There exist select PDP schemes, often referred to as POR schemes (such as CPOR),
that have the additional characteristic that the original file sent to 3rd party storage
can be recovered even after some number of failed audits. For such a scheme, this is
expressed as Pr[recover], the probability of retrieval after an  fraction of audits have
failed.
However, a strict comparison following these criteria is problematic for various reasons. For example, schemes rely on different primitives (e.g., full domain hash functions, authenticated encryption schemes, pseudorandom permutations and functions)
8

which makes parameter selection for a comparison between schemes with Pr[forge] difficult. Furthermore, schemes utilize these properties with different adversarial models with different arguments. Lastly, arguments for schemes have been expressed in
asymptotic terms, which makes parameter deviation difficult, especially when arguments use bounds that may not be tight. Because the simple, combinatorial arguments used for Pr[audit] are typically the most reusable, this research emphasizes
parameter selection for comparison with regards to Strength of Audit. Selection of
this parameter most closely relates to understanding policy on how often an audit is
performed. Because this research aims to derive the recurring cost of an audit, this
was an obvious parameter to consider and analyze carefully.

9

Chapter 3
RELATED WORK

Each PDP scheme analyzed in this thesis [5], [18], [37], [6] is based on a previously
developed and researched scheme. Each scheme is presented under the context of
attempting to minimize bandwidth and providing the user with a high probability
guarantee of data possession. This thesis further develops the feasibility of PDP
schemes by implementing these schemes and providing a cost comparison, based on
Pr[audit], between the schemes. This cost comparison can be used as a direct comparison between the schemes and allows us to determine whether any of these schemes
are feasible and if so, which scheme is most feasible. The papers summarized in
this section provide a description of how each implemented PDP scheme functions.
Following the descriptions, a more concrete definition of each scheme is provided.

The first scheme implemented in libpdp is a naive MAC based scheme. It is the
simplest of the 5 implemented PDP schemes. It works by having the user calculate a
MAC for the data they want to store on a cloud or any other 3rd party device. The
user sends the calculated MAC along with the data they want to store to the server;
whenever the user wants to verify that the data they stored remains untouched the
user simply needs to retrieve their file and corresponding MAC and calculate a new
MAC on the retrieved data. After calculating the new MAC the user compares it to
the old MAC retrieved from the server and if the two MACs are the same then the data
is also the same. While this scheme accomplishes the goals of a PDP algorithm it is
highly inefficient. The cost of retrieving the whole file and recalculating a MAC every
single time the user wants to verify data possession is too high. As an optimization
to the MAC-PDP scheme the user can split the data file into blocks and compute a
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MAC for each block. Then, the user sends both the blocks and their corresponding
MACs to the server and stores only the secret key used to calculate the MAC, sk.
When the user wants to verify data possession the user requests a randomly selected
subset of blocks and their corresponding MACs from the server. Using sk, the user
re-computes the MACs of the received blocks and compares the new MAC to the old
MAC. If the two MACs are the same, then the user is assured of the integrity of their
stored data. The rationale behind the second implementation of MAC-PDP is it is
much easier to verify a portion of the file as opposed to the entire file, which helps
limit bandwidth.

The next scheme implemented in libpdp is A-PDP [5]. Ateniese et al. devised
their PDP scheme on the basis of Homomorphic Verifiable Tags (HVTs). HVTs are
used as verification metadata by the user where the user tags each block with an
HVT and can be convinced of data possession by receiving a linear combination of
file blocks and their corresponding HVTs. A-PDP also differentiates between public
and private verifiability. With public verifiability anyone, not just the owner of the
file, can challenge the remote server and verify the server’s proof of possession as long
as they own the file owner’s public key. Ateniese, et al., introduced two main PDP
schemes, S-PDP and E-PDP, that comprise A-PDP. Both schemes are RSA-based; in
S-PDP the user splits the files into blocks and tags each block with an HVT. The user
then sends the blocks and their respective tags to the server. If the client wants to
verify data possession, the client asks the server for proof of possession of a randomly
chosen subset of blocks stored on the server. The server then generates a proof of
possession that consists of two values: T and ρ. T is a combination of the HVTs
of each requested block while ρ is obtained by raising the challenge to a function
of the requested blocks. The client can verify data possession by verifying that a
certain relation holds between T and ρ. E-PDP works similarly, the difference being
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that E-PDP only verifies the sum of the file blocks’ HVTs and not necessarily each
individual file block being challenged. This means that E-PDP runs more efficiently
at the cost of being less secure than S-PDP.

MR-PDP [18] proposed by Curtmola et al. is a PDP scheme based off of APDP. MR-PDP builds off the algorithm used in A-PDP, but allows the client to
create multiple replicas of the file to store at different servers. The rationale behind
this is that if one of the client’s files is altered for any reason the data is easily
recoverable because it’s stored at other servers. The functions used in A-PDP are
modified to accommodate multiple files for MR-PDP. MR-PDP also implements a
replica generation function that the client can use to create replicas of their data to
send to other servers. The client only needs to generate one set of HVTs, just like in
A-PDP, but to create a file replica the client masks the blocks of the original file by
concatenating the original file’s blocks with the output of a pseudo random function
(PRF). After sending each replica of the file to different servers the client can verify
data possession using the same process used in A-PDP.

SE-PDP [6] is the PDP scheme used to demonstrate the capabilities of Dynamic
Provable Data Possession (DPDP). The aforementioned PDP schemes work with
static or warehoused data, whereas SE-PDP, a DPDP scheme, allows the client to
perform dynamic file operations such as update, delete, append, and insert on data
stored by a 3rd party server. SE-PDP is based on a cryptographic hash function and
symmetric key encryption. The general idea for verification of the scheme is similar to
MAC-PDP. The client generates a number of short verification tokens before sending
the data to the server; when the client wants to verify data possession the client
challenges the server with a set of random block indices. The server then computes
an integrity check of the requested indices and sends it to the client. The client then
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verifies that the servers proof matches it’s pre-computed tokens. Unlike MAC-PDP,
A-PDP, MR-PDP, and CPOR, SE-PDP does not support unlimited auditing. In SEPDP the number of audits is chosen in advance, based on the number of generated
verification tokens.

CPOR [37] is a Proof of Retrievability (POR) scheme introduced by Shacham
and Waters. POR schemes are intended to allow the client to verify that data they
store with a 3rd party server is always retrievable or can be reconstructed by the
client. The basic implementation of POR schemes allows the client to verify data by
first encrypting the data then embedding disguised blocks (called sentinels) into the
ciphertext. The purpose of the sentinels is to detect data modification by the server.
In the verification phase the client requests for randomly selected sentinels and checks
whether or not they are corrupted. If the data stored on the server is corrupted the
sentinels are influenced with a high probability. CPOR builds on this by introducing
Homomorphic Linear Authenticators (HLAs), which work similarly to HVTs. HLAs
allow the server to aggregate the tags of individual file blocks which allows the server
to generate a short tag as a response to the client’s challenge as opposed to sending
back each sentinel. Next, detailed descriptions of each scheme are provided.

3.1

MAC-PDP

The MAC-PDP scheme is defined following the description and notation from Shacham
and Waters [37] and Riebel [35], adapted slightly for uniformity with the other schemes
in this section [13].
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Let f be a keyed PRF, as follows:

f : {0, 1}∗ × Kprf → Zp
KeyGen(1k ) → (pk, sk). Choose a random secret key for a hash-based MAC funcR

tion kmac ←
− Kprf . The secret key is sk = hkmac i and public key is pk =⊥.

Tag(M ; pk, sk, ω) → Mη∗ The file is split into n blocks, M = hm1 , m2 , ..., mn i. Choose
a random file ID η, where η ∈ Zp . For each block mi , (1 ≤ i ≤ n), generate tag
σi = M ACkmac (η||mi ). The data stored remotely is Mη∗ = hM, {σi }1≤i≤n i.

Challenge(η; pk, sk, ω) → c Choose a random `-element subset I ⊆ [1, n] of indices.
Let c be the set {i}i∈I .

Proof(η, Mη∗ , c; pk) → p For each i ∈ c, return to the verifier p = {(mi , σi )}i∈c .

?

Verify(c, p, η; pk, sk, ω) → b ∈ {0, 1} For each i ∈ c, check if σi = M ACkmac (η||mi ).
If all l checks are correct then return b = 1, else return b = 0.

3.2

A-PDP/MR-PDP

The A-PDP scheme is defined following the description and notation from Ateniese [5],
and similarly adapted slightly for uniformity with the other schemes in this section.
MR-PDP shares functionality with A-PDP. The only difference is MR-PDP provides
an additional GenerateReplica function, which is detailed below.
Let H be a cryptographic hash function, h be a full-domain hash function, f be
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a PRF and π be a Pseudo-Random Permutation (PRP) as follows (where κ, `, λ are security parameters i.e. the tunable parameters that affect how secure a computationallysecure algorithm is):

h : {0, 1}∗ → QRN (the set of quadratic residues modulo N )
f : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}log2 (n) → {0, 1}`
π : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}log2 (n) → {0, 1}log2 (n)

KeyGen(1k ) → (pk, sk) Choose safe primes p, q, where p = 2p0 + 1 and q = 2q 0 + 1.
Let N = pq. Let g be a generator of QRN , the set of quadratic residues modR

ulo N . Let v ←
− {0, 1}κ . The public key pk = hN, gi and the secret key
sk = he, d, vi, such that e is a large secret prime with ed = 1 (mod p0 q 0 ), e > λ,
d > λ.

Tag(M ; pk, sk, ω) → Mη∗ The file is split into n blocks, M = hm1 , m2 , ..., mn i. For
each block mi , compute Ti,mi = (h(Wi ) · g mi )d mod N , where Wi = v||i. The
data stored remotely is Mη∗ = hM, {(Ti,mi , Wi )}1≤i≤n i.

GenerateReplica(M ; pk, sk, ω) → Mi∗ This is an MR-PDP specific algorithm that
generates n distinct replicas {Mi }1≤i≤n , Mi = {bi,1 , bi,2 , ..., bi,m }, where bi represents each block in the original file, using random masking as follows:
for i = 1 to n do
for j = 1 to m do
1. Compute a random value ri,j = fx (i||j)
2. Compute the replica’s block bi,j = bj + ri,j
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Challenge(η; pk, sk, ω) → c To audit ` blocks of M , generate challenge c = h`, k1 , k2 , gs i,
R

where k1 and k2 are random κ-bit keys, and gs = g s mod N for random s ←
− Z∗N .

Proof(η, Mη∗ , c; pk) → p For 1 ≤ j ≤ `, generate indices ij = πk1 (j) and coefficients
aj = fk2 (j). Compute T = Tia11,mi · . . . · Tia``,mi = (h(Wi1 )a1 · . . . · h(Wi` )a` ·
1

g

a1 mi1 +...+a` mi` d

) mod N . Compute ρ =

`

a1 mi +...+a` mi`
H(gs 1

mod N ). The proof

is p = hT, ρi.

Verify(c, p, η; pk, sk, ω) → b ∈ {0, 1}. Let τ = T e . For 1 ≤ j ≤ `, compute ij =
πk1 (j), Wij = v||ij , aj = fk2 (j), and τ =

τ
h(Wij )aj

mod N . If H(τ s mod N ) = ρ

then return b = 1, else return b = 0.

3.3

CPOR

The CPOR scheme is defined following the description and notation from Shacham
and Waters [37], adapted slightly for uniformity with the other schemes in Chapter 3.3.
Let f be a keyed PRF, as follows:

f : {0, 1}∗ × Kprf → Zp
R

KeyGen(1k ) → (pk, sk) Choose a random key kenc ←
− Kenc for symmetric encrypR

tion scheme Enc, and a random HMAC key kmac ←
− Kmac . The secret key is
sk = hkenc , kmac i and public key is pk =⊥.

Tag(M ; pk, sk, ω) → Mη∗ Given the file M , split M into n blocks, each s sectors
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R

long: M = hmij i1≤i≤n . Choose a PRF key kprf ←
− Kprf and s random numbers
1≤j≤s
R

α1 , ..., αs ←
− Zp . Let τ0 = hn||Enckenc (kprf ||α1 || · · · ||αs )i. The file tag is τ =
hτ0 ||MACkmac (τ0 )i. For each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, compute

σi ← fkprf (i) +

s
X

αj mij

j=1

The data stored remotely is Mη∗ = h{mij }, {σi }i.

Challenge(η; pk, sk, ω) → c. Choose a random `-element subset I ⊆ [1, n]. For each
R

− Zp . Let c be the set {(i, vi )}i∈I .
i ∈ I choose random vi ←

Proof(η, Mη∗ , c; pk) → p The prover parses c as {(i, vi )} and computes

µj ←

X

vi mij for 1 ≤ j ≤ s, and σ ←

(i,vi )∈c

X

vi σi

(i,vi )∈c

The proof is p = hµk , σi1≤k≤s .

Verify(c, p, η; pk, sk, ω) → b ∈ {0, 1} Check
?

σ=

X

vi fkprf (i) +

s
X

αj µj

j=1

(i,vi )∈c

If equal then return b = 1, else return b = 0.

3.4

SE-PDP

The SE-PDP scheme is defined following the description and notation from Ateniese,
et al. [6], and similarly adapted slightly for uniformity with the other schemes in this
17

section.
Let t be the number of possible challenges, H be a cryptographic hash function,
AE be an authenticated encryption scheme, f be a keyed PRF and π be a keyed PRP,
defined as follows:

H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}d
f : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}log(t) → {0, 1}L
π : {0, 1}L × {0, 1}log(n) → {0, 1}log(n)
R

KeyGen(1k ) → (pk, sk) Choose secret permutation key W ←
− {0, 1}k , master chalR

R

lenge nonce key Z ←
− {0, 1}k and master encryption key K ←
− {0, 1}k . The
secret key sk = hW, Z, Ki. The public key pk =⊥.

Tag(M ; pk, sk, ω) → Mη∗ Divide message M into n blocks. Choose the number t of
possible random challenges and the number ` of block indices per verification.
For each 1 ≤ i ≤ t, generate the i-th tag as:
Generate a permutation key ki = fW (i) and nonce ci = fZ (i).
Compute the set of indices {ij ∈ [1, n] | 1 ≤ j ≤ `} where ij = πki (j).
Compute token vi = H(ci , mi1 , . . . , mi` ).
Encrypt the token σi ← AEK (i, vi ).
The data stored remotely is Mη∗ = hM, {i, σi }i.

Challenge(η; pk, sk, ω) → c Generate the i-th challenge c = hki , ci i by recomputing
ki = fW (i) and ci = fZ (i).
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Proof(η, Mη∗ , c; pk) → p Compute z = H (ci , mi1 , . . . , mi` ) where ij = πki (j). The
proof is p = hz, σi i.

?

Verify(c, p, η; pk, sk, ω) → b ∈ {0, 1} Compute v = AE−1
K (σi ). If v = (i, z) then return b = 1, else return b = 0.
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Chapter 4
PDP TAXONOMY

This section presents and explains the PDP taxonomy. The taxonomy was created by
analyzing a multitude of research papers detailing schemes related to the PDP field.
After a thorough search through various PDP schemes, characteristics were selected
that were found across multiple schemes. The goal of the taxonomy was to compile
all the research done on PDP schemes in order to select and implement a variety of
PDP schemes that accurately covered each prevalent characteristic of PDP schemes,
ensuring that the chosen schemes within libpdp are broadly representative of the current PDP approaches. Following the taxonomy, there will be an explanation of each
characteristic chosen for the taxonomy as well as an explanation of schemes within
the taxonomy. Explaining the schemes present within the taxonomy will illustrate
redundancies between the implemented schemes in libpdp and similar schemes within
the taxonomy. The chosen characteristics within the taxonomy were selected with
PDP schemes in mind, however, not every scheme conforms to every characteristic
within the taxonomy. As such, some information for certain characteristics chosen for
PDP schemes was unavailable or not pertinent to specific schemes and these cases will
be denoted with N/A within the taxonomy. The leftmost column of the taxonomy
contains references to individual PDP schemes. Each subsequent column corresponds
to a PDP characteristic found at the top of the taxonomy. An X within the taxonomy
means that the PDP scheme supports that particular characteristic.
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Taxonomy

Public Auditing

Dynamic

[2]

Multiple File Copies

Erasure Codes

Primitives

Size of Proof

Block Sizes

Public/Private Key

RSA

20 bytes

8 KB

Public

RSA

20 bytes

20 KB

Public

RSA

20 bytes

16 KB

Both

SHA-256

N/A

4 KB

Private

RSA

N/A

N/A

Public

X

RSA

257 bits

4 KB

Public

X

SHA-256

257 bits

4 KB

Public

X

IP-ECC

N/A

N/A

Private

X

ORAM

N/A

N/A

Private

X

RSA

N/A

N/A

Public

RSA

20 bytes

20 KB

Public

X

[5]

X

[3]

X

[6]

X
X

[7]
[8]

X

[9]

X

X

[11]
[15]

X

[16]

X

[18]

X

[21]
[22]

X

[23]

X

[24]

X

X

[25]
[26]

X

X

[?]
[30]

X

[31]
[32]

X

[34]
[38]

X

[39]

SHA-256

N/A

N/A

Private

PoR Codes

N/A

N/A

Private

RSA

415KB

16KB

Public

SHA-256

O(1)

16KB

Public

SHA-256

N/A

512 bits

Public

SHA-256

20 bytes

20 KB

Public

PRP

N/A

128 bits

Private

SHA-256

N/A

4 KB

Public

X

SHA-256

128 bits

4 KB

Public

X

Diffie-Hellman

N/A

N/A

Public

X

X

X

CMBT

160 bits

File Size / 128

Public

X

X

Merkle Trees

N/A

4 KB

Public

X

X

SHA-256

5 KB

4 KB

Public

HAPS

N/A

2 KB

Public

HVTs

2 KB

N/A

Public

[40]

X

[42]

X

X

[43]

X

X

[44]

X

HVTs

N/A

N/A

Public

SHA-1

N/A

4 KB

Public

[45]

X

MACs

N/A

4 KB

Public

[46]

X

SHA-256

N/A

N/A

Public

Table 4.1: PDP Taxonomy
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4.1

Public Auditing

Public Auditing, also known as Public Verification, refers to the ability for someone
other than the owner of a file to securely verify data possession or retrievability. APDP [5] provides this feature by making the parameter, e , public as well as restricting
file size. CPOR provides this option as well. This feature is also implemented in a
variety of other PDP schemes as detailed below:
Outsourced Proofs of Retrievability [3] In this paper, they introduce the notion of outsourced proofs of retrievability (OPOR), in which users can task an
external auditor to perform and verify POR with the cloud provider. In order to
establish public auditing, the client must distribute his/her public key to their
external auditor. Then, the auditor runs the algorithm detailed in [3] for the
client. If the PoR verification fails, the external auditor immediately notifies the
client. The process of distributing the public key for external auditing works
very similarly in A-PDP and CPOR.
Integrity Verification Over Untrusted Cloud Servers [8] This paper presents
an MR-PDP scheme very similar to the MR-PDP scheme implemented in libpdp.
Their proposed scheme consists of five algorithms: KeyGen, CopyGen,TagGen,
Prove, and Verify. The function of these algorithms is nearly exactly the same
as libpdp’s MR-PDP scheme with the exception of Verify. In [8], Verify can
be run by an external auditor if the public key is shared, a feature already
implemented by schemes within libpdp.
Provable Multicopy Dynamic Data Possession In Cloud Computing Systems [9]
This paper is written by the same authors as the above scheme. The proposed
scheme in this paper is fairly similar; the main difference is the scheme in this
paper is dynamic. The scheme consists of 7 algorithms (KeyGen, CopyGen,
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TagGen, PrepareUpdate, ExecUpdate, Prove, and Verify) which is typical of
DPDP schemes. The additional algorithms, PrepareUpdate and ExecUpdate,
are used to allow the client to modify their data.

Similar algorithms are

implemented in SE-PDP, the dynamic PDP scheme implemented in libpdp.
Efficient Simultaneous Robust Provable Data Possession [26] The intuition
behind their protocol in general is that the server is required to prove the
knowledge of a linear combination of file blocks (indicated by the challenge),
where the coefficients are based on a value randomly chosen by the client in
each protocol run. Along with this linear combination, the server aggregates
the tags corresponding to the challenged file blocks, which enable verification
by the client without having access to the actual file blocks [26]. This protocol
is very similar to the scheme implemented in A-PDP [5]. Public auditing in
both schemes behaves relatively the same, making this scheme [26] redundant.
Enabling Proof of Retrievability in Cloud Computing [30] This
PoR scheme implements the use of 2 separate servers. Particularly, one server
is for auditing on behalf of the client, and the other for storage of the client’s
data. The client is relieved from the computation of the tags for files, which is
moved and outsourced to the cloud audit server. Furthermore, the cloud audit
server also plays the role of auditing for the files remotely stored in the cloud
storage server [30]. The use of a server to play the role of auditor makes this
scheme unique, but the execution of public auditing with this scheme is generic.
The server responsible for auditing simply verifies data retrievability similarly
to any external auditor.
Public Data Integrity Verification for Secure Cloud Storage [32] The

im-

plementation of this scheme is very similar to the implementation of A-PDP.
The user generates keys and then splits the file up into blocks and tags each
23

block. To challenge, the client generates a random subset of blocks and requests
a proof of data possession from the server. Using generated metadata, the
client can verify the server’s proof, just like A-PDP. Furthermore, the public
auditing in both schemes is performed similarly making [32] redundant.
Practical Dynamic Proofs of Retrievability [38] This PoR scheme works similarly to [9] with the main difference being that it does not generate file replicas.
Both schemes allow for public auditing on data that can be dynamically updated. However, the public auditing implemented in this scheme is not drastically different from the public auditing implemented within A-PDP and CPOR
and is therefore considered redundant.
Panda: Public Auditing for Shared Data in the Cloud [40] One of the primary functions of Panda is to account for different scenarios involving shared
data. With shared data, if a user in a group needs to be denied access, the
user should no longer have access to the shared data. Therefore, although the
content of shared data is not changed during user revocation, the blocks, which
were previously signed by the revoked user, still need to be re-signed by an
existing user in the group. As a result, the integrity of the entire data set can
still be verified with the public keys of existing users only [40]. This scheme
uses HVTs to allow public verification, an idea that is already implemented by
A-PDP.
Proofs of Retrievability with Public Verifiability in the Cloud [42] In this
scheme the data owner first breaks an erasure coded file into n blocks and
generates an authentication tag for each block. All data blocks and tags are
outsourced to the server; when a client wants to retrieve data from the server,
he generates a challenge message and sends it to the server. The server generates a proof of correctness based on the challenge message, the public key
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and the previously stored tags, then returns the response to the client. Client
runs a verification algorithm upon receiving the response [42]. In this scheme,
any client with access to the public key can run this, not just the data owner.
Many concepts in this scheme (erasure codes, public verification, challenge/response implementations) are already implemented by schemes present in libpdp
(namely, A-PDP and CPOR).
Secure Public Cloud Storage Auditing with Deduplication [43] This
scheme combines PDP characteristics with a PoW (Proof of Ownership)
scheme to improve storage efficiency as well as making sure the data is secure.
PoW schemes employ deduplication of common files, meaning instead of storing
multiple copies of the same file for many different users, a server will only
store one copy of a file, which is shared by many different users. As far as
PDP characteristics are concerned, this paper primarily explores the concept of
public auditing, which they achieve in a similar manner to A-PDP and CPOR.
Public Integrity Auditing for Dynamic Data Sharing [44] Like many of the
above schemes that support public auditing, this scheme functions similarly to
A-PDP: the client generate keys, splits the file into blocks and tags each block.
Then client sends the blocks and tags to the servers, deletes their local copies
and performs challenges to the server and verification of proofs similar to the
A-PDP process. Furthermore, this scheme implements public verification in a
generic way, making it unnecessary to implement in libpdp.

4.2

Dynamic

The dynamic characteristic of PDP schemes refers to a scheme’s ability to allow the
client to dynamically update data stored with a 3rd party server. This allows the
client to append data to existing stored data or delete existing stored data while
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maintaining secure proofs of data possession or retrievability. SE-PDP is the scheme
within libpdp that supports this feature. Schemes that implement both public auditing
and dynamic features were explained above and therefore will not be re-explained in
this section.
Dynamic PoR via Oblivious Ram [15] This paper implements a Dynamic PoR
scheme utilizing Oblivious RAM (ORAM). The dynamic characteristics of this
scheme are similar to those of SE-PDP. Furthermore, recent works on ORAM
have shown that even the fastest known constructions incur a large bandwidth
overhead in practice [38] making this scheme impractical to implement in libpdp.
Robust Dynamic PDP [16] This paper attempts to add robustness to a DPDP
scheme. Robust means that the auditing scheme incorporates mechanisms for
mitigating arbitrary amounts of data corruption [16]. Their protocol can be
constructed in four phases: Setup, Challenge, Update, and Retrieve. SE-PDP’s
update algorithms are implemented similarly to the Update phase implemented
in [16], making this scheme redundant.
Dynamic Provable Data Possession [23] This scheme is based on a rank-based
authenticated skip list, in which, only the relative indexes of blocks are used, so
it can efficiently support dynamism. The proof for a block is computed using
values in the search path from that block up to the root of the skip list. Since a
skip list is a tree-like structure that has probabilistic balancing guarantees, the
proofs will have O(log n) complexity with high probability [23]. This scheme
implements it’s dynamic portions differently than SE-PDP, but the result is
ultimately the same as both schemes allow the client to dynamically update
data stored with 3rd party servers.
Replicated Dynamic Provable Data Possession [24] This scheme describes 3
parties: the client, the cloud, and the organizer which is a server that commu26

nicates with all other servers on the cloud. Their scheme utilizes both replication
and distribution (copies and stores the original copy of the stored file as well
as distributing copies to other servers). The CSP is transparent to the client
through the organizer server. This scheme implements the same 7 functions
that many DPDP schemes use (KeyGen, CopyGen, TagGen, PrepareUpdate,
ExecUpdate, Prove, and Verify). Its heavily based on the above DPDP scheme
(it uses rank-based authenticated skip lists) but also introduces distributions of
replicas managed by the organizer that also gives this scheme the benefits of
MR-PDP. Ultimately, the dynamic and multi-replica attributes of this scheme
are already implemented by schemes present within libpdp.
Improved Dynamic PDP [31] This scheme presents many implementations already present within libpdp. In their scheme, they divide the file into blocks,
generate a tag for each block, compute a hash value for each tag, and use tags
to ensure the integrity of the file blocks. Their update function works similarly
to SE-PDP, and the overall scheme works similarly to A-PDP.
Dynamic PDP with log(N) Complexity [34] In this paper, they extend the
static PoR scheme to a dynamic scenario. That is, the client can perform update operations, e.g., insertion, deletion and modification. After each update,
the client can still detect the data losses even if the server tries to hide them.
They develop a new version of authenticated data structure based on a B+ tree
and a merkle hash tree. They call it the Cloud Merkle B+ tree (CMBT) [34].
Exact implementation details of the CMBT are provided within [34] but the
basis of their scheme functions similarly to any dynamic scheme. While [34]
and SE-PDP implement their dynamic functions differently, the results are the
same.
Iris: A Scalable Cloud File System [39] One of the key innovations in Iris is
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the design of a sparse randomized erasure code over the file-system data and
metadata. The new erasure code is specifically crafted to hide the code parity
structure (typically revealed by other codes during file updates) and be resilient
against a potentially adversarial cloud. It enables recovery when corruptions
are detected through auditing [39]. However, this paper does not provide significantly unique implementations of concepts already implemented in libpdp.
It’s dynamic features behave like SE-PDP’s.
Efficient Dynamic PDP [45] This paper implements similar DPDP ideas, but
uses what they coin as a Balanced Update Tree. The size of the tree doesnt
depend on the amount of data stored in the cloud, but rather the number of
updates (modifications, insertions, and deletions) to the remote blocks. The
distinctive feature of their scheme: all dynamic operations are not followed by
an integrity check, which saves computation and communication cost. Instead,
data is verified in the standard challenge/response format. Their format also
allows revision control and support for multiple users sharing the same data.
Challenge/Response is achieved via public key encryption [45]. The implemented dynamic operations in this scheme are similar to SE-PDP and their
verification process is implemented in various schemes within libpdp.
Fair and Dynamic PoR [46] This scheme introduces a new property, called fairness, which they claim is necessary and also inherent to the setting of dynamic
data because, without ensuring it, a dishonest client could legitimately accuse
an honest cloud storage server of manipulating its data [46]. Like the aforementioned DPDP schemes, their implementation of dynamic operations does not
deviate sharply from those of SE-PDP.

While each DPDP scheme contains unique elements, ultimately the dynamic
operations of each scheme were not different enough from those present within
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SE-PDP to justify adding an additional dynamic scheme to libpdp.

4.3

Multiple File Copies

Multiple File Copies refers to a PDP scheme’s ability to allow the client to generate
replicas of their data stored with a 3rd party and store the replicated file copies with
other servers. Should any sort of data corruption occur, the stored replicas ensure
that the client’s data is still retrievable. MR-PDP is the scheme implemented within
libpdp that supports this feature. As explained before, schemes that contain both
multi-replica and one of Public Auditing or Dynamic operations are mentioned above
and therefore will not be mentioned in this section.
Mirror: Enabling PoR in the Cloud [2] This paper presents an issue with
multi-replica PDP: large bandwidth on the user, and the user can take advantage of reduced costs from the cloud by saying they’re storing replicas when
they’re really not (cloud cant tell because all the files are encrypted). Mirror is
a tunable replication scheme. Mirror shifts the burden of constructing replicas
to the cloud provider itself [2]. It implements the concept of MR-PDP, but the
cloud creates the replicas instead of the user. The PoR aspects of their scheme
are based on those used in CPOR, making them extremely similar. The primary
difference between this scheme and [18], the MR-PDP scheme implemented in
libpdp, is that in this scheme the cloud is expected to generate and store replicas. However, this would be difficult to implement with current cloud APIs and
require extra services to implement the additional client/server interactions.

Additional MR-PDP schemes mentioned above do not dramatically alter the
implementation used in [18] making additional MR-PDP schemes unnecessary
to implement within libpdp.
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4.4

Erasure Codes

Erasure coding is a form of data protection where data is split into fragments, expanded and encoded with redundant data pieces and stored across various different
locations. It is a process prevalent in PoR schemes to ensure data retrievability.
CPOR is the scheme implemented within libpdp that employs this characteristic.
Hail: High Ability and Integrity Layer [11] This paper presents HAIL; it is
used as an upgrade to POR schemes. They make use of PORs as building blocks
by which storage resources can be tested and reallocated when failures are detected [11]. For the dispersal code in HAIL, they propose a new cryptographic
primitive that they call an integrity-protected error-correcting code (IP-ECC).
Their IP-ECC construction draws together PRFs, ECCs, and universal hash
functions (UHFs) into a single primitive. This primitive is an error-correcting
code that is, at the same time, a corruption-resilient MAC on the underlying
message. The additional storage overhead is minimal, basically just one extra
codeword symbol [11]. Rather than replicating the stored file across servers,
they instead distribute it using an error-correcting (or erasure) code. The PoR
schemes presented in this paper do not differ greatly from CPOR, and their use
of erasure codes are similar.
PoR via Hardness Amplification [22] Introduces their own primitive, PoR
Codes, as the foundation of their PoR scheme: A PoR code consists of three
procedures: Init, Read, and Resp. The function Init specifies the initial encoding of the original client file F into the server file F = Init(F) which is stored
on the server. The functions Read and Resp are used to specify a challengeresponse audit protocol. The client sends a random challenge e which consists
of two parts e = (e1, e2). The first part of the challenge identifies a set of t
indices (i1, . . ., it ) = Read(e1), which correspond to t locations in F0 that the
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server should read to compute its response [22]. Their use of erasure codes is
to ensure data retrievability, just like that of CPOR.

4.5

Primitives/Block Sizes/Proof Sizes/Keys

Various primitives are used throughout PDP schemes. The schemes implemented
within libpdp implement a variety of different primitives. They also utilize different
block/proof sizes with public key schemes as well as private key schemes. MAC-PDP
and SE-PDP are built using symmetric key primitives: MAC-PDP is perhaps the
simplest PDP scheme, requiring no (cryptographic) computation to be performed by
the cloud provider, whereas the SE-PDP scheme requires some amount of server-side
computation. CPOR adds public verifiability and optimizes for proof compactness.
A-PDP relies upon public key primitives, requires server-side computation, and can
provide public verifiability. MR-PDP builds off of A-PDP by allowing the client to
generate and store file replicas. Beyond their underlying primitives, all the schemes
differ in the size and computational complexity of their tags, challenges, and proofs,
allowing us to differentiate storage versus computation costs [32].
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Chapter 5
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The performed PDP experiments can be divided into two phases: a set-up phase and
an audit phase. In the set-up phase, the client generates keys (pk, sk), generates a
tagged file, Mη∗ , and sends Mη∗ to remote storage (see Figure 5.1(a)). For the audit
phase, the client generates a challenge c and sends it to the prover; the prover responds
with a proof p, which is sent to the client; the client verifies the proof and indicates
success or failure (see Figure 5.1(b)).

((a)) Set-up phase of PDP protocol

((b)) Audit phase of PDP protocol

Figure 5.1: Set-up and audit phases of PDP experiment. Adapted from
[5]: A-PDP.

5.1

Measurements and Costs

It is important to define what system costs are measured in each of the experiments
performed in libpdp. The operations included in libpdp’s measurements are included
in Figure 5.2. Costs associated with transfer time and service latency are ignored,
while a particular focus is put on significant, recurring computational costs. This is
because various environments and deployments would suffer these costs differently,
so it is hard to argue these costs as minimal or inherent.
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Figure 5.2: Timing Measurement Definitions
In the set-up phase the cost of generating keys (pk, sk) is ignored. During tagging,
libpdp ignores the cost of sending the file and tag data Mη∗ to the storage server S. In
the audit phase, libpdp ignores the transfer time involved in sending the challenge to
prover P and in returning the proof to client C. For proof generation, however, libpdp
includes the time associated with retrieving challenge blocks from local or remote
storage, including this as part of the proof time. We believe the cost associated
with parsing the challenge, retrieving the data required for the proof, and the cost
of generating the proof itself are intimately related, so these are combined in our
measurement.

5.2

Implementation

Our benchmark test is a single-threaded application written in C using the libpdp
library [33], an open-source C library providing implementations for MAC-PDP, APDP, MR-PDP, CPOR, and SE-PDP. In all experiments, the benchmark application
is run on Amazon Web Services, including Amazon Elastic Cloud (EC2) and the
Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3). The client, auditor, and prover are each run
on the same EC2 instance: a c3.xlarge instance, running 64-bit Ubuntu Server 14.04
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LTS using HVM virtualization. In other environments, these three parties might be
separate hosts or owned by separate organizations (i.e. tagging performed by the data
owner, and auditing performed by a third-party). Because it was chosen to define tag,
challenge, and verify timing measurements, the properties of the network connecting
these parties are irrelevant to the measurements and so these parties are run on the
same host. For each of the implemented schemes, there are two types of benchmarks:
using local data storage and using remote data storage. For local storage experiments,
Mη∗ is stored at the EC2 instance’s local storage. For the remote storage experiments,
Mη∗ is stored to an Amazon S3 bucket.
Table 5.1: Default Benchmark Parameters
MAC-PDP ` = 460, kmac = 20 bytes
A-PDP
` = 460, N = 1024 bits, PRP k1 = 16 bytes, PRF k2 =
20 bytes
MR-PDP
` = 460, N = 1024 bits, PRP k1 = 16 bytes, PRF k2 =
20 bytes
CPOR
` = 460, kenc = 32 bytes, kprf = 20, kmac = 20 bytes, λ
= 80, p = 80 bits, sector size = 9 bytes
SE-PDP
` = 460, AE K = 16 bytes, PRP W, Z = 16 bytes, PRF
ki = 20 bytes, t = 1
Experiments are run sequentially, each time doubling block size or file size for a particular scheme. Pre-experiment trials in which the order of experiments are randomized
demonstrated no discernible impact to our results; thus, it is strongly believed that
the trials are independent and order of test execution had no impact to the results.
Each experiment is performed using pre-generated, random input file data. Every
experiment is repeated three times (graphs in Section 6 show raw data from all three
iterations). The default parameters (guided by each scheme’s author recommendations) used for each scheme is provided in Table ??.

34

Chapter 6
OPERATION MODELS

Timing data is analyzed and collected for each of the five major PDP operations:
KeyGen, Tag, Challenge, Proof and Verify. For each model, the following notation is
employed:
- bs, block size in bytes
- fs, file size in bytes
- ss, sector size in bytes
- c0 , c1 , . . ., model-specific constants.
For all schemes, fs/bs yields the number of blocks in the file M , and bs/ss yields the
number of sectors per block.All model-specific constants are derived experimentally
using least-squares approximation. In each experiment, there is a point where the file
size and block size are such that the total number of blocks falls below the default
number of challenges selected for an audit. At this point, fewer computations are
performed, resulting in faster algorithm times. Otherwise, all schemes approach some
threshold where proof cost becomes constant [13]. Because MR-PDP utilizes the
approach used by A-PDP, much of it’s timing data is exactly the same. The only
notable difference is MR-PDP endures higher overhead in certain situations due to
the generation of file replicas. Therefore, it can be assumed that the results shown for
A-PDP in the following data figures also apply to MR-PDP. Situations where A-PDP
performs differently than MR-PDP will be noted and clarified.
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6.1

Tag File

In the experiment, there is no theoretical difference between running the Tag algorithm with local data or S3 data. The measurements also bear this out, showing
comparable performance.

((a)) File size vs. tag time

((b)) Block size vs. tag time

Figure 6.1: File and block size vs. tag time for local data experiments.

((a)) File size vs. tag time

((b)) Block size vs. tag time

Figure 6.2: File and block size vs. tag time for S3 data experiments.

6.1.1

MAC-PDP

When block size is held constant and file size increases, tag time increases linearly
(see Figs 6.1(a) and 6.2(a)). When file size remains constant and block size varies,
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tag time is nearly constant (see Figs 6.1(b) and 6.2(b)). This aligns with expectation:
MAC-PDP generates tags via a hash-based MAC and the hash algorithm generates
a digest through repeated operations on fixed-size blocks. Thus, the operation time
should be proportional to the size of the input. These trends are summarized in
Eq 6.1, expressing this simple linear model.

c0 + c1 · fs
6.1.2

(6.1)

A-PDP/MR-PDP

When block size is held constant and file size increases, tag time increases linearly (see
Figs 6.1(a) and 6.2(a)). When file size is held constant and block size increases, tag
time decreases proportionally (see Figs 6.1(b) and 6.2(b)). This is because A-PDP
and MR-PDP generate tags through modular exponentiation on every block. As file
size grows, there are more blocks to tag, resulting in increased execution time. As
block size increases, there are fewer blocks to tag. These trends are summarized in
Eq 6.2, expressing tag time as proportional to the file size and inversely proportional
to the block size.

c0 + c1 · fs/bs + c2 · bs + c3 · fs
6.1.3

(6.2)

CPOR

When block size is constant and file size increases, tag time increases linearly (see
Figs 6.1(a) and 6.2(a)). When file size is constant and block size increases, tag time is
constant (see Figs 6.1(b) and 6.2(b)). In CPOR, tag costs are dominated by per-sector
modular multiplication and addition through the use of HLAs. The change in block
size has little effect on the overall cost of generating HLAs so the algorithm times
remain nearly constant despite changing block sizes. These trends are summarized in
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Eq 6.3, expressing tag time as proportional to file size and inversely proportional to
sector size.

c0 + c1 · fs + c2 · fs/ss
6.1.4

(6.3)

SE-PDP

When block size is held constant and file size increases, tag time increases linearly up
to a point, after which tag time remains constant (see Figs 6.1(a) and 6.2(a)). When
file size is held constant and block size increases, tag time increases linearly until
the point at which it becomes constant (see Figs 6.1(b) and 6.2(b)). This is because
SE-PDP generates tokens by calculating the hash of a specified number of blocks.
The tag time, then, is proportional to the number of bytes processed, determined by
the number of blocks per token and the block size. The number of blocks per token is
defined by the default security parameter `. These trends are summarized in Eq 6.4,
expressing tag time as proportional to total bytes processed.

(c0 + c1 · min((min(fs/bs, `) · bs, fs)) · t

(6.4)

Above, min((min(fs/bs, `) · bs, fs) expressed the number of bytes processed per token.
When fs/bs < r, the entire file is processed to generate tokens.

6.2

Generate Challenge

In the performed experiments, there is no theoretical difference between running the
Challenge algorithm with local data or using AWS S3. The measurements verify this
statement.
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((a)) File size vs. challenge time

((b)) Block size vs. challenge time

Figure 6.3: File and block size vs. generate challenge time for local
experiments.

((a)) File size vs. challenge time

((b)) Block size vs. challenge time

Figure 6.4: File and block size vs. generate challenge time for S3 data
experiments.
6.2.1

MAC-PDP

When block size is held constant and file size increases, challenge time is constant
until the point after which it switches to a slower constant cost (see Figs 6.3(a) and
6.4(a)). When file size is held constant and block size increases, similar bi-modal
constant trends exist (see Figs 6.3(b) and 6.4(b)). This is explained in terms of the
challenge indices ` and the number of blocks fs/bs. When there are fewer total blocks
than `, then all indices are used during the challenge. However, when there are more
blocks than `, then the challenge indices must be randomly selected, which requires
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more complex logic than the logic required to simply select all indices, resulting in
slower challenge speeds. These trends are summarized in Eq 6.5.

df s/bse < ` : c0
df s/bse ≥ ` : c1

6.2.2

(6.5)

A-PDP/MR-PDP

The generate challenge operation is constant time regardless of file or block size (see
Figs 6.3 and 6.4). This is because A-PDP and MR-PDP challenges are independent
of the file or block size. These trends are summarized in Eq 6.6, expressing challenge
time as constant.
c0
6.2.3

(6.6)

CPOR

When block size is held constant and file size increases, the generate challenge time
increases to the point after which it becomes constant. When the file size is held
constant and the block size increases, the challenge time is constant time to a point
after which it decreases proportionally to the number of blocks (see Figs 6.3(b) and
6.4(b)). This is explained in terms of CPOR generating a random `-element set for
the challenge. As file size increases, the size of this set increases, until the number of
blocks exceeds `. Similarly, when the block size increases, there may be fewer than `
blocks available. These trends are summarized in Eq 6.7, expressing challenge time
as either constant or proportional to the number of blocks.

dfs/bse < ` : c1 + c2 · fs/bs
dfs/bse ≥ ` : c0

40

(6.7)

6.2.4

SE-PDP

When block size is held constant and file size increases, generate challenge runs in
constant time (see Figs 6.3(a) and 6.4(a)). As the file size is held constant, challenge
runs in constant time up to a point, after which the time is almost twice as slow
(see Figs 6.3(b) and 6.4(b)). The former trend is explained in terms of SE-PDP
recomputing ki and ci for the i-th challenge, neither of which is affected by the file
size. Unfortunately, the latter trend seems to be an anomaly and is difficult to explain.
Nothing in the algorithm design suggests that block size should affect the run time,
and the anomaly is likely an artifact of implementation. These trends are summarized
by Eq 6.8, expressing challenge time as constant.

c0

6.3

(6.8)

Generate Proof

Unsurprisingly, due to what is included in proof costs (see Fig 5.2), there is a noticeable difference in performance of proof costs when comparing local data storage
and remote storage. These two scenarios are analyzed separately. For experiments
interacting with S3, it is observed that when block size is held constant and file size
increases, proof time increases linearly up to the point where the number of blocks
exceeds `, after which the proof time is constant (see Fig 6.7(a)). When file size is held
constant and block size increases, proof time is nearly constant up to the point where
` exceeds the number of blocks, after which proof time decreases (see Fig 6.7(b)).
This is because each GET from S3 takes significantly more time than generating the
proof itself (see Fig 6.6). Thus, the number of GETs dominates this trend. For MACPDP, A-PDP, and CPOR the server executes one GET for each challenge block and
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((a)) File size vs. GETs

((b)) Block size vs. GETs

Figure 6.5: File and block size vs. number of GETs from S3.
one GET for each corresponding tag (see Fig 6.5), summarized in Eq 6.9.

2 · min(fs/bs, `)

(6.9)

For SE-PDP, there is one GET for each challenged block, but only one GET for the token
corresponding to the i-th challenge (see Fig 6.5). This is summarized in Eq 6.10, which
express the number of GETs as one more than the total number of blocks or one more
than `, whichever is less.

In general, for local data experiments, it is observed that when block size is held
constant and file size increases, the proof time increases linearly up to the point where
the number of blocks exceeds the number of challenge blocks, after which proof time
is nearly constant. When the file size is held constant and the block size increases,
proof time increases linearly up to the point where ` exceeds the number of blocks,
after which the proof time is constant. Each scheme reflects this same general trend,
with their own model-specific constants.

min(fs/bs, `) + 1
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(6.10)

((a)) File size vs. proof time

((b)) Block size vs. proof time

Figure 6.6: File and block size vs. generate proof time for local data
experiments.

((a)) File size vs. proof time

((b)) Block size vs. proof time

Figure 6.7: File and block size vs. generate proof time for S3 data
experiments.

43

6.3.1

MAC-PDP

For local data experiments, the same general trends described earlier are observed (see
Figs 6.6(a) and 6.6(b)). This is because in MAC-PDP, the proof is dependent on the
total number of bytes hashed. These trends are summarized in Eq 6.11, expressing
proof time as proportional to the total number of blocks, file size and block size.

dfs/bse < ` : c0 + c1 · fs/bs + c2 · bs + c3 · fs
dfs/bse ≥ ` : c4 + c5 · bs

6.3.2

(6.11)

A-PDP/MR-PDP

For local data experiments, the same general trends described earlier are observed
(see Figs 6.6(a) and 6.6(b)). This is because A-PDP and MR-PDP generates proofs
through modular exponentiation of ` message blocks. Thus proof time depends on
both the number of challenge blocks as well as the size of each block. These trends
can be summarized in an identical way as in Eq 6.11, with its own model-specific
constants.
6.3.3

CPOR

For local data experiments, the same general trends described earlier are observed (see
Figs 6.6(a) and 6.6(b)). This is explained in terms of CPOR generating the proof
by computing µj and σ for each of the indices in the challenge set. Additionally,
µj involves modular multiplication of all sectors of each challenge block. Therefore,
proof time increases with the indices in the challenge set, as well as when the block
size increases. These trends can be summarized in an identical way as in Eq 6.11,
with its own model-specific constants.
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6.3.4

SE-PDP

For local data experiments, the same general trends described earlier are observed
(see Figs 6.6(a) and 6.6(b)). This is explained in terms of SE-PDP generating the
proof by computing the hash of all message blocks for a particular token. Proof time
is proportional, then, to the number of bytes hashed, which is proportional to the
number of challenge blocks and block size. These trends can be summarized in an
identical way as in Eq 6.11, with its own model-specific constants.

6.4

Verify Proof

In our experiments, there is no theoretical difference between running the Verify
algorithm with local data or using AWS S3. The measurements verify this statement.

((a)) File size vs. verify time

((b)) Block size vs. verify time

Figure 6.8: File and block size vs. verify proof time for local data
experiments.

6.4.1

MAC-PDP

It is observed that when block size is held constant and file size increases, verify time
increases linearly up to the point where the number of blocks exceeds `, after which it
remains constant (see Figs 6.8(a) and 6.9(a)). When file size is held constant and block
size increases, verify time increases linearly up to the point where ` exceeds the total
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((a)) File size vs. verify time

((b)) Block size vs. verify time

Figure 6.9: File and block size vs. verify proof time for S3 data
experiments.
number of blocks, after which it remains constant (see Figs 6.8(b) and 6.9(b)). This is
because MAC-PDP verifies a proof by hashing each index in the challenge. Therefore,
verify time is dependent on the total bytes hashed. These trends are summarized in
Eq 6.12, expressing proof time as proportional to file size or proportional to block
size.

dfs/bse < ` : c0 + c1 · fs
dfs/bse ≥ ` : c2 + c3 · bs

6.4.2

(6.12)

A-PDP/MR-PDP

It is observed that when block size is held constant and file size increases, verify time
increases linearly up to the point where the number of blocks exceeds `, after which
it remains constant (see Figs 6.8(a) and 6.9(a)). When file size is held constant and
block size increases, verify time remains constant up to the point where ` exceeds
the total number of blocks, after which it decreases linearly (see Figs 6.8b and 6.9b).
This is explained in terms of A-PDP and MR-PDP verifying proofs by generating τ
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and comparing the hash of τ with ρ. Since τ is computed by generating ` hashes,
time will be proportional to the total number of blocks challenged. These trends are
summarized in Eq 6.13, expressing verify time as constant or proportional to the total
number of blocks.

dfs/bse < ` : c1 + c2 · fs/bs
dfs/bse ≥ ` : c0

6.4.3

(6.13)

CPOR

As in the other schemes, it is observed that when block size is held constant and file
size increases, verify time increases linearly up to the point where the total number of
blocks exceeds `, after which it remains constant (see Figs 6.8(a) and 6.9(a)). When
file size is held constant and block size increases, verify time increases linearly (see
Figs 6.8(b) and 6.9(b)). This is explained in terms of CPOR verifying the proof by
summing αj µj for all sectors of each block being challenged. As file size grows, the
number of sectors for each challenge increases. As blocksize grows, the number of
sectors per block increases. We summarize these trends in Eq 6.14, expressing verify
time as proportional to the number of blocks, file size and block size, or proportional
to just the block size.

dfs/bse < ` : c0 + c1 · fs/bs + c2 · bs + c3 · fs
dfs/bse ≥ ` : c4 + c5 · bs

6.4.4

(6.14)

SE-PDP

It is observed that when block size is held constant and file size increases, verify time
remains constant (see Figs 6.8(a) and 6.9(a)). When the file size is held constant and
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the block size increases, the verify time remains constant up to a point, after which
the verify time runs anomolously slow (see Figs 6.8(b) and 6.9(b)). Generally, these
SE-PDP trends reflect the cost of decrypting σi and comparing it with the proof.
This decryption time is not dependent on file size or block size, and we believe that
slow-down anomaly is an artifact of implementation and not an inherent feature of
the scheme. These trends are summarized in Eq 6.15, expressing the verify time as
nearly constant.

c0
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(6.15)

Chapter 7
OPERATION COST MODELS

Costs are broken into three categories for analysis: (1) the upfront cost to tag, (2)
the recurring cost to store and (3) the regular cost to audit. SE-PDP is not depicted
on the cost graphs because, whereas MAC-PDP, A-PDP, MR-PDP, and CPOR all
support an unlimited number of audits once the file is tagged, the number of audits
for SE-PDP is chosen in advance. Thus a total cost graph for SE-PDP will depend
on the desired frequency of audits before a file needs to be re-tagged. Additionally,
the base cost of MR-PDP mirrors that of A-PDP (base cost meaning the use of no
replicas). The cost of MR-PDP is directly proportional to the number of file replicas.

It is noted that costs in the results should be thought of as minimal costs. Some
costs that reasonable implementations may incur are not measured, such as costs
associated with waiting for a response from the prover, or the wake-up costs for the
prover when it receives a request (see Fig 5.2). Measuring these costs would reflect
network latency and implementation-specific details we do not believe to be strongly
related to PDP. Also, in implementations where multiple audits may be performed for
clients simultaneously, modeling ‘wakeup’ or ‘downtime’ costs would be misleading.
Thus the basis costs do not reflect all possible actual costs, but can be used to
accurately compare cost among schemes [13].

We chose to implement our benchmark tests on AWS; however, there are several
alternatives with comparable pricing schemes and storage options—Microsoft Azure
Blob storage, and Google Cloud Storage all have similar services and pricing schemes.
The AWS S3 storage pricing scheme is shown in Table 7.1, current as of Sept. 2016 [1].
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Table 7.1: AWS S3 Standard Storage Pricing
Cost / GB
First
Next
Next
Next
Next
Over

1 TB / month
49 TB / month
450 TB / month
500 TB / month
4000 TB / month
5000 TB / month

$0.0300
$0.0295
$0.0290
$0.0285
$0.0280
$0.0275

Table 7.2: Comparison of Cloud Providers Remote Storage Limitations
Max object size Max PUT size Max metadata size
Amazon S3
5 TB
Microsoft Azure
195 GB
Google Cloud Storage 5 TB
Rackspace
5 GB

7.1

5 GB
64 MB
5 TB
5 GB

2 KB
8 KB
unspecified
4 KB

Tag Costs

Tag costs consist of the cost to generate the tag and the PUT costs associated with
uploading the file to storage (see Fig 7.1). These costs were calculated based on the
cost to generate and store tags using Amazon EC2. In general, the more complex
the tag, the longer it takes to create, which directly correlates to the cost create and
store the tag. Therefore, these costs resemble the trends observed for timing costs
associated with generating a tag (see Fig 6.1(a)), with A-PDP and MR-PDP being
the most expensive, followed by CPOR, and MAC-PDP. The approximate basis costs
to tag a file range from a fraction of a cent to $3 for a 1 GB file; $0.13 to $20 for a 1
TB file; and $135 to $20,400 for a 1 PB file.

7.2

Storage Costs

The storage cost of each scheme is calculated (see Fig 7.2) based on their corresponding tag sizes (see Table 7.3). Since A-PDP and MR-PDP have the largest tag size,
they have the highest storage cost. MAC-PDP and CPOR have almost the same tag
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Figure 7.1: Cost to tag, based on tag algorithms and AWS EC2 pricing
size and, therefore, very similar storage costs.

It is appealing to consider the option of storing tags as metadata, attempting to get
object tags “for free,” however all the reviewed storage providers included metadata
as part of the overall file size. Additionally, at the time of publication, AWS S3 limits
metadata storage to 2KB. The maximum file sizes tags can be stored as metadata on
AWS S3 are shown in Table 7.4.

7.3

Audit Costs

The total audit cost (see Fig 7.3) is calculated by determining the number of GETs
and computational cost to generate a challenge, generate a proof and verify the proof.
Since proof time is significantly larger than the challenge or verify times (compare Fig
6.7 with Figs 6.4 and 6.9), it is not surprising to find that proof time dictates audit cost
trends. Additionally, differences in proof times observable in local data experiments

Table 7.3: Tag File Overhead and Tag Size
Tag file overhead Tag size
A-PDP
4.864%
MR-PDP
4.864%
MAC-PDP 0.477%
CPOR
0.429%
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204
204
20
18

Figure 7.2: Cost to store tag, based on scheme tag overhead and AWS S3
pricing

Figure 7.3: Cost to audit, based on audit cost models and AWS EC2 and
S3 pricing

((a)) File size vs. overhead

((b)) Block size vs. overhead

Figure 7.4: File and block size vs. tag file overhead.
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Table 7.4: Maximum file sizes at which tags can be stored as metadata on
AWS S3
File size
MAC-PDP
A-PDP
MR-PDP
CPOR
SE-PDP

((a)) Tag, storage, and audit costs for 1 GB file

428 kb
41 kb
41 kb
476 kb
0 kb

((b)) Tag, storage, and audit costs for 1 TB file

Figure 7.5: Cumulative tag, storage, and audit costs for one audit per
hour.

((a)) File size vs. storage and audit costs

((b)) File size vs. storage and audit costs

Figure 7.6: File size vs. storage and audit costs for files at one audit per
hour for one month.
(see Fig 6.6) nearly disappear in S3 experiments due to the relatively larger times
required to communicate with S3 and transfer proof data. As a consequence of
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the communication time common to all schemes, audit costs are nearly identical for
MAC-PDP, A-PDP, MR-PDP, and CPOR. It is worth noting that the audit cost for
SE-PDP is approximately half that of the three other schemes, since SE-PDP employs
fewer GETs than the other schemes.

7.4

Total Cost Models

It is observed that the monthly cost to store and audit once per hour is nearly identical
for all schemes until the storage costs begin to dominate at larger file sizes, after which
A-PDP and MR-PDP become much more expensive than MAC-PDP and CPOR
(see Fig 7.6). Since audit costs are nearly identical for all three schemes, the tag
and storage costs have the most significant impact on the total cost of each scheme.
Figs 7.5(a) and 7.5(b) show the up-front cost to tag and cumulative cost storing and
auditing a 1 GB and 1 TB file, respectively, at one audit per hour each month. For the
1 GB file, the tag and storage costs are less significant and the slightly higher audit
cost of MAC-PDP can be observed at one year of audits; however, the high tag and
storage costs of the 1 TB file dominate, resulting in a higher cost for the A-PDP and
MR-PDP schemes. The following are approximate basis costs incorporating up-front
cost to tag and cumulative cost storing and auditing at one audit per hour for one
year: $160 to $175 for a 1 GB file; $170 to $230 for a 1 TB file; and $2,000 to $38,700
for a 1 PB file.

MAC-PDP and CPOR generally performed better than A-PDP and MR-PDP,
especially for large file sizes, leading to the conclusion that both MAC-PDP and
CPOR would be more ideal for a practical implementation. SE-PDP provides benefits
in terms of the lack of GETs executed by the server because SE-PDP requires a
GET for each challenged block, but only one corresponding token as opposed to each
corresponding tag. However, MAC-PDP is the only implemented scheme that requires
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no server-side computation, meaning it should work without needing to alter any
existing cloud APIs. Due to its relatively low cost and storage only nature, MACPDP seems to be the most practical scheme to implement.
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Chapter 8
FUTURE WORK

Future work for this thesis can focus on further implementation of PDP schemes
within libpdp. Currently, there are only 5 schemes implemented within libpdp and
while those 5 schemes are representative of PDP schemes more schemes would provide additional cost analysis. Furthermore, libpdp could be used as a tool for future
implementations of PDP schemes. Future implementations could use libpdp’s cost
analysis as a justification for the strength of their scheme.

The benchmark tests covered a limited number and type of PDP implementations,
future studies could create benchmarks that incorporate erasure codes, or dynamic
data, among other variants. The experiments performed in this thesis ignored costs
associated with transfer time and service latency, focusing instead on computational
costs. Follow-on work could separate the client, auditor, and prover in order to measure the communication costs between each entity. Furthermore, follow-on work could
compare costs choosing different security parameters. In the experiments performed
by this thesis, we selected security parameters designed to normalize comparison in
terms of the strength of audit. Future work could select parameters to facilitate
scheme comparison in terms of other properties, such as strength of security and
efficiency of recovery.

Additional work could include attempting a practical implementation of MAC-PDP
or similar scheme this thesis found more cost effective with commercial cloud services.
While the cost analysis in this thesis is a useful tool for identifying which schemes
could afford to be practically implemented, no practical implementation has been
performed as of yet.
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Chapter 9
CONCLUSION

In this thesis, generic cost models were developed as well as an open-source library
implementing five, representative PDP schemes that can be used to estimate lowerbounds for economic costs. This thesis showed that for small files all schemes, regardless of their complexity, exhibit an affordable basis cost, ranging from $0.13 to
$20 per year for a 1TB object. However, once the file size becomes sufficiently large,
prices can range from $135 to $20,400 per year for a 1 PB object depending on the
chosen scheme. The most significant contributors to this gap are the costs associated
with preprocessing and storage in schemes using asymmetric key operations. Schemes
that utilize symmetric key primitives (e.g. MAC-PDP and CPOR) are comparable
in cost, whereas the cost of schemes utilizing public-key primitives (e.g. A-PDP and
MR-PDP) becomes significantly more expensive for data sets of realistic size. Furthermore, there exists the possibility for significant cost savings for schemes that
optimize for compactness and minimize the number of GETs performed by the server
in exchange for supporting only a finite number of audits (e.g. SE-PDP).

The models used in libpdp are optimistic—they ignore some costs incurred by realistic, hypothetical deployments of PDP audit services for existing cloud infrastructures.
Specifically, the cost models in libpdp ignore many costs associated with utilizing a
third-party auditor. However, even with this cost ignored, schemes that utilize thirdparty auditors, such as CPOR, provide no practical cost advantage over the simple
MAC-PDP scheme. Furthermore, CPOR is a scheme that relies on server-side computation, whereas MAC-PDP is a storage only scheme. The implementation of MACPDP would not require the server to provide any extra services or APIs. Because
MAC-PDP requires no server-side computation, we conclude that this scheme would
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be most practical to implement and that future PDP schemes should be developed
with realistic cloud limitations in mind.
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